Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s return to the front lines against Israel may have minimal immediate effects, but carries significant long-term implications for Lebanon’s sectarian dynamics and the divisive goals of western and Gulf-backed Sunni parties.
Recently, Jama’a al-Islamiyya (JI or the ‘Islamic Group’) – a Lebanese party affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood – has made a notable resurgence on the political and military scene. This comeback was marked by the active involvement of its armed wing, the Fajr Forces, established in 1982, in recent confrontations along Lebanon’s southern border with Israel.
The clashes led to the loss of 3 group members, who fell victim to Israeli forces in the southern Lebanese village of Al-Habbariyeh on 10 March.
The Islamic Group, rooted in Lebanon since 1964, commands significant influence within the Lebanese Sunni community. It boasts a network of supporters that spans various regions, including Beirut, the Bekaa, Sidon, Tripoli, and Al-Arqoub.
Chafik Choucair, a researcher at the Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, argues that the group holds considerable sway in Lebanon, given that “it ranks second after the Future Movement” of Saad Hariri. However, it lacks a proportional parliamentary representation. “In the current parliament, for example, it has only one representative, Imad al-Hout,” he explains.
‘Cooperation with Hezbollah’
The revival of the Islamic Group’s resistance operations has stirred unease among many in the Lebanese Sunni community, particularly those aligned with US-allied Arab states that view the Muslim Brotherhood with skepticism, as well as secular segments of this community.
So when JI’s Secretary-General Sheikh Muhammad Takkoush told AP on 29 March that military cooperation with Hezbollah was vital in the fight against Israel on the southern border, Sunni Lebanon sat up and took notice.
“Part of (the JI’s attacks against Israeli forces) were in coordination with Hamas, which coordinates with Hezbollah,” Takkoush revealed about his groups’ military operations, adding that JI’s direct cooperation with Hezbollah “is on the rise and this is being reflected in the field.”
Hezbollah is designated as a “terrorist organization” in many Persian Gulf Arab states that have long served as Lebanon’s most critical financial patrons, particularly for the country’s Sunni political parties.
As recently as February 2024, Saad Hariri, head of the Future Movement, said, “If I sense that Lebanon’s Sunnis are leaning toward extremism, then I will intervene.” Many, however, understood this to represent a green light from Persian Gulf states for the former prime minister – who withdrew from politics in 2022 – to return to his leading role in Lebanese politics if other Sunni movements, including the Islamic Group, began to gain too much support from the country’s Sunni public.
Sunnis in support of the Resistance
Regionally and internationally, the Islamic Group is considered part of the global organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 in Egypt by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna. Under the mantle of this organization are several parties and movements spread throughout the Islamic world, such as Kuwait, Syria, Sudan, Qatar, Malaysia, and other countries.
Perhaps the most prominent is the Hamas movement, established in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in Palestine. Like Hamas, the Brotherhood has close ties with countries such as Turkiye, Qatar, and Iran.
Qasim Kassir, a Lebanese researcher, quoted sources in the Islamic Group, denying any relationship between its organization and the Qatari and Turkish presence in Lebanon. As one source told Kassir:
It is true that the group has positive relations with Qatar, as well as with Turkiye and its party and relief institutions, and that there is an active presence of Muslim Brotherhood leaders in these two countries … But the group’s political programs in Lebanon have nothing to do with the Qatari and Turkish roles.
According to former Secretary-General of the group, Azzam al-Ayoubi, “Sunni Muslims in Lebanon are looking to any force that can support them for the sake of internal balance, based on their search for a way to restore the lost balance in Lebanon.”
It goes without saying that the stance of key regional players like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt towards the Islamic Group is intricately tied to their broader negative views of the Muslim Brotherhood, with all three countries characterizing the organization as a terrorist entity.
However, the Islamic Group’s ideology emphasizes unity over sectarian divides, aiming to foster cohesion between Sunni and Shia communities.
This may explain its keenness to build good relations with the Shia community in Lebanon, especially with Hezbollah, and with Iran in the wider region.
In this context, the Iranian cultural advisor in Lebanon, Kamil Baqir, stressed during a visit with Takkoush that Tehran stands with all liberation and resistance movements “to achieve justice and liberate Palestine.” Iran’s Ambassador to Beirut, Mojtaba Amani, has also previously praised the relations between Iran and the group.
Others downplay any substantive ties between JI and the Lebanese resistance. Muhannad al-Haj Ali, a researcher at the Carnegie Center, believes the group is not affiliated with Hezbollah – despite press sources quoting a JI leader saying that the two are in “the same trench on the level of the Palestinian file.”
That connection is slowly becoming indisputable. As JI political official Ali Abu Yassin has stated: “All the forces operating in southern Lebanon are coordinating with each other.”
Stance on Syria
But the relationship between the Islamic Group and Hezbollah is not without its complexities, particularly concerning the decade-long Syrian conflict. This tension stems from the strained ties between Hamas and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since 2011, which in turn impacted relations between the Islamic Group and Hezbollah.
The 2022 election of Takkoush as Secretary-General of the group, however, marked a period of improved relations despite ongoing challenges in reconciling differences over Syria. He was quoted at the time as saying, “We and Hezbollah are similar to each other.”
Abu Yassin informs The Cradle that burgeoning relations with the region’s Axis of Resistance does not come with any strings:
We have no relationship with any country and are not an arm for anyone. We are an independent Lebanese movement with its own goals, visions, and performance. This fact is not hidden from anyone, and our position on the Syrian crisis has not changed.
Instead, JI’s return to the resistance front is an organic one, in which confronting Israel has become an organizational priority after the occupation state’s brutal military assault on Gaza. It executes this goal “through full coordination with the Hamas movement, supporting all militant forces, and ensuring that the Lebanese arena remains an arena of confrontation against the Israeli occupation.”
This certainly explains JI’s recent involvement in battles in Lebanon’s south. A number of its members (whose total number may be 500, according to some estimates) have participated in border military operations in support of Gaza.
‘An extension of Hamas’
One JI leader has admitted to the Fajr Forces leading “joint operations with Hamas.” As the deputy head of the group’s political bureau, Bassam Hammoud has acknowledged, “We and Hamas are two sides of the same coin in confronting the Zionist enemy.”
Imad al-Hout, the Islamic Group’s sole deputy in Lebanon’s parliament, says the size of the Fajr Forces is set “according to what is necessary for them to respond to the aggression, and they are funded with their own capabilities.” For Hout, “as long as there is aggression, the group will continue to fire missiles at Israel.”
Abu Yassin elaborates on the group’s military wing, calling their recent performance in the field “good, even excellent,” and explains their return to battle thus:
Supporting Gaza is a defense of Lebanon because if the enemy wins over Gaza, and it will not, then the next day, it will be attacking Lebanon. What was required was achieved: exhausting the enemy south and putting pressure on its internal front, and the goal was to stop the enemy stopping its aggression.
An informed source, speaking on condition of anonymity, tells The Cradle that while “the Islamic Group has somewhat advanced military capabilities, it certainly does not reach the level of military technology in the hands of Hezbollah.”
It is clear that the Fajr forces possess Kornet missiles, which are effective in battle, but it is not possible to be certain of the source from which these missiles come, even though Hezbollah possesses large quantities of them.
External pressures and internal discord
A recent report by Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar newspaper illustrates just how worried the US and its Arab state allies are about JI moving to the resistance front line – and how that may enhance Sunni–Shia relations in the country.
Western intelligence services are seeking the assistance of allied Arab agencies that have networks in Lebanon to collect information about the group’s cadres and their leaders who are close to the resistance movement while trying to attract leaders in the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood organization to incite them to reject any relationship with Hamas or Hezbollah, as they are one of the arms of the Iranian project aimed at controlling the Sunni society.
Commenting on the news report, Abu Yassin argues that his organization “is a fully-fledged institution, and its work an institutional one … Therefore, the group is very difficult for lurkers, if there are any. No one can influence its decisions.”
But Al-Akhbar revealed in an extraordinary exclusive today that foreign Arab actors are determined to do just that.
The newspaper points to an effort sponsored by the Egyptian and Saudi embassies in Beirut to stem the growth of the Islamic Group with “mobilization.”
Both Arab and Western parties active in Lebanon’s Sunni arena – which include Dar al-Fatwa, the remnants of Nasserist movements, anti-Muslim Brotherhood Islamic frameworks, and various associations – to launch a campaign aimed at containing JI’s solidarity with Hamas and working to isolate the Islamic Group as its most prominent ally.
According to the news report, a raft of rumors are starting to make the rounds in Beirut:
About a Hamas-sponsored coup in the Islamic Group’s leadership; about it attracting cadres from the group’s youth to work in its ranks; and about Hamas’ leader abroad, Khaled Meshal, providing large annual funding for the group to enhance its capabilities as a resistance faction. The Egyptians, in particular, blame the group’s Secretary-General Sheikh Muhammad Takkoush and accused him of leading a Hamas-designed maneuver to create a reality in the Sunni arena whose reference would be the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, with the help of Qatar.
Indeed, as one informed source tells The Cradle, there have been clear changes within JI since the election of Sheikh Takkoush as secretary-general:
This rift began as a result of Takkoush adopting a line calling for openness to Hezbollah and thus Iran, especially since the pro-Hamas wing that opposed Hezbollah and Syria was larger within the group before Takkoush’s arrival. Especially that Hamas was financing the group financially due to Lebanon’s economic crisis.
Lebanese journalist Samer Zreik explains the discord, revealing that some members perceive the security leadership within the organization as prioritizing external agendas, namely those of Hamas and Hezbollah, over the group’s own goals.
But as a major Lebanese Sunni party, the Islamic Group’s decision to embrace both Sunni and Shia resistance again is a welcome development in a country with a divided history and an existing sectarian divide. JI’s reaching across this divide serves not only the just cause of solidarity with Palestine, but also the national interests of the Lebanese state.
By Bilal Nur Al-Deen
Published by The Cradle
Republished by The 21st Century
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 21cir.com