Apparently, Ankara was ready to reopen the old conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, not only in order to permanently resolve the issue of the ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh. This conflict was also needed in order to significantly reduce Moscow’s influence on the territory of the South Caucasus.
The escalation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, apparently, was planned by the regional players in advance in order to block Russian influence on Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.
However, Moscow does not intend to concede the “palm”, preferring to wait for the moment to deliver a painful blow to Turkish ambitions.
Initial information from the line of contact between the Armenian and Azerbaijani troops boiled down to presenting the escalation as a spontaneous manifestation of tension.
In addition, the majority of experts were unanimous in the opinion that the fighting would end soon enough and the parties would again sit down at the negotiating table.
However, Turkey’s excessively increased interest in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the intensity of the Azerbaijani-Turkish military exercises, indicate that the hostilities are the result of a long-planned action. Meanwhile, the degree of Turkish participation in the unfolding confrontation remains uncertain.
Apparently, Ankara was ready to reopen the old conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, not only in order to permanently resolve the issue of the ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh.
This conflict was also needed in order to significantly reduce Moscow’s influence on the territory of the South Caucasus.
Today Turkey and Russia, in addition to Israel, Iran, France, and the United States, are the leading arbiters of the Second Karabakh War, occupying diametrically opposed sides in it.
And, probably, Ankara seeks to fuel the Azerbaijani patriotic upsurge until Moscow finally admits defeat and renounces influence on the region.
In addition, the Kremlin is expected to agree to a change in the geopolitical map of the South Caucasus, in which there will be no place for the administration of the unrecognized republic.
Nevertheless, Moscow still has “trump cards in its sleeves”, thanks to which it can turn the tide on the front in favor of Armenia and the Artsakh Defense Army.
In particular, according to Russian politicians, Moscow, as a member of the CSTO, cannot officially designate its participation in the Karabakh conflict, at least “until military actions take place directly on the territory of Armenia.”
It was a loud signal for Yerevan, meaning that there should be military actions on the territory of Armenia, despite all the odiousness of these words.
This state of affairs can be orchestrated through a tactical retreat of the Armenian armed forces in order to provoke the Azeri army to violate the state border of Armenia and thus induce Moscow to intervene.
If such a scenario is realized, then one should not expect that the Second Karabakh War will end in November 2020, as some Azerbaijani experts predict.
The war will drag on for at least 3-5 years.
In any case, Turkey and Russia have enough resources to wage trench warfare during the specified period of time.
It is worth noting that despite Moscow’s inability to stop hostilities by organizing a negotiation process, it still has the ability to influence the political environment of the warring parties. Three attempts to secure a ceasefire were unsuccessful.
However, both in Baku and in Yerevan there is a highly developed pro-Russian lobby, thanks to which the Kremlin has the opportunity to adjust the policies of both countries if the need arises.
It is no coincidence that on the eve of the escalation of the conflict, Azerbaijan obstructed the former head of the presidential administration Ramis Mehdiyev, who for many years was Moscow’s “eyes and ears”.
The pro-Russian agents in the warring countries are now the most active, since the Kremlin cannot act to ensure regional stability using only official channels of diplomacy.
Most likely, sooner or later Russia will support Armenia. After all, there is a Russian military base on the territory of Armenia, and the Armenian-Turkish border is guarded by Russian border guards.
In addition, Yerevan remains an important economic partner for Moscow.
The provision of support to Armenia is also dictated by the fact that Moscow intends to put pressure on Turkey, especially after the policy of Recep Erdogan, in the opinion of representatives of the Russian establishment, has become uncontrollable.
By Denis Korkodinov
Published by OneWorldPress
Republished by The 21st Century
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 21cir.